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Abstract
In the aftermath of the U.S. nancial crisis, both a sharp drop in em-
ployment and a surge in corporate cash have been observed. In this paper,
based on U.S. data, we document that the negative relationship between
the corporate cash ratio and employment is systematic, both over time and
across rms. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model where het-
erogenous rms need cash in their production process and where nancial
shocks are made of both credit and liquidity shocks. We show that external
liquidity shocks generate a negative comovement between the cash ratio and
employment. We analyze the dynamic impact of aggregate shocks and the
cross-rm impact of idiosyncratic shocks. With a calibrated version of the
model, the model yields a negative comovement that is close to the data.
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1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the U.S. nancial crisis, both a sharp decline in employment and
an accumulation of cash held by rms have been observed. While both variables are
part of rmsdecisions, they are typically not considered jointly in the literature.
To what extent are these two features related? Holding liquid assets facilitates
the rms ability to pay for the wage bill. But employment and cash decisions also
react to changes in rms environment, e.g., changes in credit conditions. Therefore,
examining these two variables jointly sheds light on the role of nancial shocks
on employment, especially during the crisis. The contribution of this paper is
twofold. First, it provides stylized facts on the relationship between the corporate
cash position and employment. Second, it delivers an explanation to the empirical
evidence by building a tractable dynamic general equilibrium framework, including
both cash and employment decisions. This framework sheds a new light on the
impact of nancial shocks by distinguishing between liquidity and credit shocks.
Liquidity shocks appear to be crucial to explain the relationship between cash and
employment.
We rst document a robust negative comovement between the corporate cash
ratio and employment on U.S. data, which is not specic to the recent nancial
crisis. Using Flow-of-Funds data over the period 1980-2011, the correlation between
HP-ltered employment and the share of liquid assets in total assets is  0:41.
Moreover, using rm-level data from Compustat, the annual cross-rm correlation
between employment and the cash ratio is on average  0:29 over the same period.
Section 2 provides a detailed description of this data analysis.
To understand the optimal cash and employment decisions, we consider an
innite-horizon general equilibrium model with heterogeneous rms that need liq-
uid funds in their production process. Liquidity is closely related to labor because
rms have liquidity needs in order to nance the wage bill, which is part of work-
ing capital. We adopt a structure similar to Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995),
who divide periods into two subperiods. In the rst subperiod, rms use credit to
install capital, while they need liquid funds to pay workers in the second subpe-
riod. In contrast to the literature introducing working capital in macroeconomic
models (see Christiano et al. 2011, for a survey), we assume that rms do not
have full access to external liquidity and cannot borrow all their short-term needs.
This generates a demand for cash. Liquidity that is external to the rm may take
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several forms, such as credit lines, trade credits, trade receivables to customers, or
late wage payments. Liquidity shocks are changes in the availability of external liq-
uidity. We assume that rms may be hit by technology shocks, by changes in their
ability to obtain long-term credit (i.e., standard credit shocks) and by liquidity
shocks. These shocks can be at the aggregate or at the idiosyncratic level.
The model is designed to be tractable so that several results can be derived
analytically. It suggests that liquidity shocks can explain the negative comovement
between employment and the corporate cash ratio. A reduction in external liquid-
ity generates two e¤ects. On the one hand, lower liquidity reduces the nancial
opportunities of rms and depresses labor demand. On the other hand, the reduc-
tion in external liquidity makes the production process more intensive in cash to
ensure that wages are fully nanced. Firms assets are then tilted towards cash.
Combining these two e¤ects implies that the cash ratio increases while employ-
ment declines. This analysis points to the crucial role played by the tightening of
liquidity conditions in the aftermath of the Lehman crisis. While no initial sharp
reduction in credit supply was observed during the recent nancial crisis, rms
experienced a signicant deterioration in their expected liquidity conditions. For
example, Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) argue that banks cut the existing corpo-
rate lines of credits during the crisis.1 Also, short-term loans to business rms
decreased by 9% between 2008 and 2009 (using Survey of Terms of Business Lend-
ing, maturity of less than 30 days) while the liquidity ratio sharply increased from
3.9% to 5%.
Similar to Jermann and Quadrini (2012), we derive the series of technology and
nancial shocks from a calibrated version of our model. We also nd that nan-
cial shocks are a major source of uctuations, especially during the recent U.S.
nancial crisis. However, our model gives a more subtle view of nancial shocks,
by disentangling the role of liquidity shocks and credit shocks. This distinction
is possible through the introduction of cash holdings in our model. From the ob-
servations of the cash ratio in the data, we are able to identify liquidity shocks,
along with standard credit shocks and TFP shocks. These liquidity shocks are
1Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that rms initially drew heavily on their credit lines,
but that subsequently credit conditions tightened. Campello et al. (2011) show that some rms
had their credit lines canceled and that other rms had to renegotiate their credit lines with a
higher cost. More generally, credit line agreements may contain restrictive covenants that may
limit the ability of borrowers to draw on their lines. See also Chari et al. (2008) or Kahle and
Stulz (2013).
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not signicantly correlated with credit shocks over the whole dataset. Feeding the
three types of shocks back in our model, we nd that liquidity shocks are key to
generate a negative correlation between the cash ratio and employment. Besides,
liquidity shocks generate the bulk of short-term uctuations, while credit shocks
are more important in the medium-term. Idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are also
important to explain the negative cross-rm correlation between cash and labor.
The model is parametrized using moments distribution from rm-level data. De-
spite its simplicity, the model performs relatively well quantitatively to reproduce
the negative cross-rm correlation between the cash ratio and employment. Our
benchmark calibration gives a correlation of  0:13, while it is  0:29 in the data.
The optimal choice of corporate liquidity is rarely introduced in macroeconomic
models, even in models with nancial frictions. When it is, the focus is on invest-
ment, not labor. Liquid assets are usually held by households, typically in the form
of money, to nance their consumption.2 However, rms also have liquidity needs.
Papers incorporating rmsliquidity are typically in the spirit of Holmstrom and
Tirole (2011) and Woodford (1990); they include Aghion et al. (2010), Kiyotaki
and Moore (2012) or Bacchetta and Benhima (2015). However, these papers do
not analyze employment uctuations.
While the link between liquidity and employment has not received much atten-
tion so far, our analysis is related to several strands of the literature. First, there is
a growing literature that incorporates rmsnancial frictions in a macroeconomic
context. For instance, Covas and den Haan (2011) and Jermann and Quadrini
(2012) analyze corporate external nance decisions over the business cycle, such as
debt and equity. However, these papers do not introduce cash. For example, in
their theoretical model, Jermann and Quadrini (2012) have working capital that is
fully nanced by an intra-period loan. Other papers focus more closely on the rela-
tionship between nancial factors and the labor market. This literature stresses the
role of nancial frictions inuencing labor demand.3 Most of these papers provide
a more detailed analysis of the labor market than we do, but they do not consider
cash holdings. Our analysis focuses on the impact of liquidity conditions on labor
demand.
2There are obviously some exceptions. For example, Stockman (1981) considers a cash-in-
advance constraint both for consumption and capital.
3See for instance Wasmer and Weil (2004), Benmelech et al. (2011), Monacelli et al. (2011),
Boeri et al. (2012), Chodorow-Reich (2014), Karabarbounis and Neiman (2012), Pagano and
Pica (2012) or Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013).
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Our paper is also related to a vast theoretical literature in corporate nance
on rmscash holdings and corporate saving. Our approach shares features with
several recent papers that provide analyses at the rm level or in environments
with heterogeneous rms. Some papers are particularly close to our approach as
they focus on the role of nancing conditions on cash decisions.4 Our paper di¤ers
from this literature by focusing on business cycle frequency and on employment,
which plays a key role in the working capital management. In addition, we provide
a general equilibrium analysis which is important in the context of employment as
this is an input that is not generated by the rm (in contrast to capital). As a
result, market-clearing wage uctuations can potentially o¤set partial equilibrium
e¤ects. This is particularly relevant in the context of liquidity management as the
wage bill a¤ects rmsliquidity needs. Another di¤erence is that we make a clear
distinction between liquid and less liquid assets. The recent dynamic models in the
corporate nance literature consider cash a negative debt or as a residual between
cash ow and investment.5
Finally, our approach is consistent with the ndings of the empirical literature
on the determinants of corporate cash.6 This literature stresses in particular the
precautionary motive to save cash and shows that this motive increases with cash
ow uncertainty or with more uncertain access to capital markets (see for instance
Almeida et al., 2004). Some papers have also analyzed the use of short-term credits,
like credit lines, and their interaction with corporate cash holdings. They tend to
show that cash is a substitute to credit lines, as suggested by our analysis. For
instance, Campello et al. (2011) nd a negative correlation between cash and credit
lines.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the negative
comovement between corporate cash and employment. Section 3 presents the model
and shows the basic mechanism that can lead to this negative relationship. In
Section 4, we calibrate the model to analyze the dynamic impact of aggregate
4See for example, Bolton et al. (2013), Eisfeldt and Muir (2013), Falato et al. (2013), Gao
(2013) and Hugonnier et al. (2014). Some papers consider other determinants of rms cash
holdings (Armenter and Hnatkovska, 2011; Boileau and Moyen, 2012).
5This contrasts with an older corporate nance literature, see Holmstrom and Tirole (2011).
6See, for example, Bates et al. (2009) and Almeida et al. (2013) for surveys.
7Similarly, Su (2009) and Lins et al. (2010) show that internal cash is used more in bad
times while rms are more likely to use credit lines in good times. Acharya et al. (2013) build a
model to show that rms would rather use credit lines instead of cash reserve when they face a
low aggregate risk.
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shocks. In Section 5, we examine the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on cross-
rm correlations. Section 6 discusses various extensions and Section 7 concludes.
Several results are derived in the Appendices.
2 Stylized Facts
In this section, we document the negative correlation in the U.S. between the cor-
porate cash ratio and employment, both in aggregate terms and at the rm level.
We rst illustrate the aggregate correlation between corporate cash and employ-
ment over the business cycle. We use quarterly data in the non-farm non-nancial
corporate sector. The cash ratio, dened as the share of corporate liquidity to total
assets, is built from the Flow of Funds of the United States. We dene cash as the
sum of private foreign deposits, checkable deposits and currency, total time and
savings deposits and money market mutual fund shares. Corporate employment
in logarithm is drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Figure 1 displays the
HP-ltered component of employment and the cash ratio over the sample 1980q1-
2011q4.
[ insert Figure 1 here ]
We observe a negative comovement between the two variables. This negative re-
lationship is particularly striking from the Great Recession since the corporate
liquidity ratio experienced a large boom from 2009 while employment has been
strongly depressed. Over the whole sample, the contemporaneous correlation be-
tween employment and the cash ratio is negative ( 0:41) and signicant at 1%.8
We show below that this negative correlation is mostly driven by liquidity shocks
in our model.
The aggregate correlations that have been documented are driven by macroeco-
nomic shocks common to all rms. In order to capture the heterogeneity among
rms, we assess the correlation between the corporate cash ratio and employment
using disaggregated rm-level data from Compustat. The sample contains US non-
nancial rms from 1980 to 2011. We focus only on rms that are active during
the whole period, which allows us to have a homogeneous panel. In addition, we
8In order to avoid any spurious correlation, we also compute the correlation when cash is
divided by the one-quarter lagged value of total assets instead of its current value. The correlation
is still negative ( 0:42) and signicant. The correlation by excluding the Great Recession is lower
( 0:18) but signicant at 10%. Robustness exercises are provided in the online appendix.
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drop the 10% largest rms. This is a standard procedure (e.g., see Covas and den
Haan, 2011) as the largest rms may have a specic behavior. For example, the
cash holding of multinational companies might be driven by foreign tax incentives
(see Foley et al., 2007). We also exclude nancial and utilities rms, rms which
are not incorporated in the US market and those engaged in major mergers.9 This
is justied by the fact that part of the stock of cash holding is a¤ected by acquisi-
tion. We also drop all rms with negative or missing values for: total assets, sales,
cash and employees.10 We use the number of employees per rm (Compustat data
item #29) as our measure of employment. The corporate cash ratio is dened as
the ratio between cash and short term investment (Compustat data item #1) and
the book value of assets (Compustat data item #6). A rm-specic linear trend
is removed from both employment and the cash ratio. Figure 2 plots the year-
by-year cross-rm correlation coe¢ cients between these two variables with their
signicance level.
[ insert Figure 2 here ]
Over the period, the cross-section correlation between detrended employment and
cash ratio is  0:29 on average and it is signicant at 1%.11 The negative corre-
lation is signicant in all periods and is stronger in 2007. While we only present
unconditional correlations, the negative relationship between employment and cash
holding is robust when we use OLS with rms-xed e¤ects, years-xed e¤ects, and
standard control variables (see online appendix). In particular, this relationship is
not driven only by macroeconomic shocks or by systematic di¤erences across rms.
Our model also accounts for this idiosyncratic correlation.
An important assumption of our model is that cash holding decisions are deter-
mined by wage bill nancing. From our database, we observe that cash represents
18% of their sta¤ expenses (median value).12 Moreover, in the online appendix,
9Using Compustat data items, we remove rms when 6000<SIC<6999, 4900<SIC<4949,
curcd 6= USD and sale_fn = AB.
10The sample is reduced to 14 563 rm-year observations. Data description and descriptive
statistics are provided in the online appendix.
11The online appendix shows that the correlation is  0:28% (signicant at 1%) when we do
not exclude the 10% largest rms.
12The series sta¤ expense (Compustat data item #42) includes salaries, wages, pension costs,
prot sharing and incentive compensation, payroll taxes and other employee benets. To coun-
teract the scarce availability of this variable, we extend the dataset with the 10% largest rms.
The sample now consists in 2 435 rm-year observations. The online appendix shows that the
distribution of rmssize and cash ratio is slightly a¤ected in this alternative sample. In addition,
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we show that there is a positive relationship between past cash holding and the
current amount of sta¤ expenses. This result suggests that rms hold more cash
prior to a rise in sta¤ expenses, which is in line with our models assumption. This
positive relationship is robust to the presence of rms-xed e¤ects and holds both
at the rm and industry level.
In this paper, we argue that cash holdings and employment are driven by fu-
ture prospects about the availability of external liquidity. There are alternative
potential explanations for the negative correlation between the cash ratio and em-
ployment. First, the demand for cash can be driven by the cyclicality in the cost
of cash (e.g., see Azar et al., 2014). For example, during the crisis, the ight to
liquidity can partly be explained by the drop in interest rates which decreased the
opportunity cost of cash. However, the negative rm-level correlation is robust to
the inclusion of years-xed e¤ects, which indicates that it is not driven exclusively
by business cycle e¤ects like the cost of cash. A second alternative explanation
emphasizes the role of unexpected shocks. For example, following a negative unex-
pected productivity shock, rms lay o¤ workers, which generates more cash ow.
However, using our panel of rms from Compustat, we show that the correlation
coe¢ cient remains negative and signicant when we control for cash ows (see
online appendix). Moreover, the correlation coe¢ cient is still negative and signif-
icant when we use the lagged cash ratio and when we control for the size of the
rm (see online appendix). These two pieces of evidence suggest that the corre-
lation between employment and the cash ratio is not driven solely by unexpected
productivity shocks.
3 A Dynamic Model of Corporate Cash Holdings
The single-good economy is inhabited by innitely-lived heterogeneous entrepre-
neurs and identical households. Entrepreneurs produce, hire labor, invest, borrow,
and hold cash. Households work, consume, lend to entrepreneurs and also hold
cash. We abstract from nancial intermediaries. Liquidity is modeled by dividing
each period in two subperiods, which we refer to as beginning-of-period and end-of-
period. The market for illiquid debt only opens at the beginning-of-period. Firms
the correlation between the cash ratio and employment is  0:17 and still signicant at 1%.
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have a liquidity need at the end-of-period as they have to pay for the wage bill.13
This liquidity need can be covered either by external liquidity or by cash holdings.
Therefore, the need for cash is a¤ected by changes in the availability of external
liquidity. We rst describe the problem of entrepreneurs and then turn to their
optimal behavior, focusing on optimal labor demand and cash. We characterize
analytically the properties of the model in this partial equilibrium. Finally, we
describe the general equilibrium model by introducing households.
3.1 Entrepreneurs
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs of length 1. Entrepreneur i 2 [0; 1] maxi-
mizes:
Et
1X
s=0
su(cit+s) (1)
where cit+s is the consumption of entrepreneur i in period t + s. Entrepreneur i
produces Yit out of capital Kit and labor lit through the production function
Yit = F (Kit; Aitlit)
where F is a standard constant-return-to-scale production function and Ait is total
factor productivity (TFP). Capital depreciates at rate . TFP is composed of an
aggregate component and an idiosyncratic one:
Ait = At + 
A
it (2)
where At follows an AR(1) process and Ait follows a Markov process, with E(At) =
A and
R 1
0
Aitdi = 0.
Entrepreneurs enter beginning-of-period t with initial income 
it and can bor-
row in illiquid debt Dit to pay for their consumption, their capital, and cash Mit.
Debt Dit is illiquid in the sense that it can only be issued at beginning-of-period.
We follow Jermann and Qadrini (2012) by assuming that rms benet from a sub-
sidy on debt, so the gross interest rate on debt is rt = Rt, with 0 <  < 1,
where Rt is the before-tax interest rate.14 Cash bears no interest. The rms
13For convenience we only consider labor as end-of-period input. In a related context, Gao
(2013) considers raw material instead of labor.
14This tax advantage of debt is also found in Hennessy and Whited (2005). It reects the rms
preference for debt over equity (pecking order). In our model, this pecking order is represented
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beginning-of-period budget constraint is:

it +Dit = cit +Kit +Mit (3)
The cash ratio mit is dened as the proportion of cash to total assets, i.e., mit 
Mit=(Kit +Mit). As Dit is never negative in equilibrium, it is never part of gross
assets.15 Initial income is made of output, the remaining capital stock, and unused
cash minus the gross interest rate payment on debt and the cost associated with
external liquidity used in the previous subperiod:

it = Yit 1 + (1  )Kit 1 + fMit 1   rt 1Dit 1   rLt 1Lit 1 (4)
where fMit 1 is unused cash, Lit 1 is external liquidity obtained in the previous
end-of-period and rLt  1 is the cost associated with it.
Liquidity shocks a¤ect the magnitude of external liquidity Lit available to rms.
At end-of-period t, rms need to pay for wages out of their cash or any liquid funds
they obtain in that subperiod. They face the following liquidity constraint:
Mit + Lit  wtlit (5)
where wt is the wage rate. Unused cash is simply dened as fMit =Mit Lit wtlit. It
will be equal to zero in most of our analysis. We assume that liquidity is constrained
by lenders. Due to standard moral hazard arguments, a fraction 0  it  1 of
the capital stock at the beginning-of-period has to be used as collateral for debt
repayments, i.e.,
rLt Lit  it(1  )Kit: (6)
We will assume that rt > rLt , so that r
L
t Lit = it(1   )Kit.16 Shocks to it are
therefore liquidity shocks, i.e., shocks that a¤ect the amount of external liquidity.17
The liquidity shock it is assumed to be composed of an aggregate component
by the fact that the rms will have a tendency to consume (which corresponds to distributing
dividends) and as a consequence they will be leveraged up to the maximum level.
15Dit is non- negative because all rms are always constrained due to the debt subsidy and
because we abstract from equity issuance. If some rms were unconstrained, they could choose a
negative Dit, and thus hold both bonds and cash.
16In reality, the interest rate on short-term liquidity is not necessarily lower than longer-term
borrowing. But the borrowing period is shorter so that the actual borrowing cost is lower.
17External liquidity could also vary with the proportion of wages that have to be paid at
end-of-period.
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and an idiosyncratic one:
it = t + 

it (7)
where t follows an AR(1) process and it follows a Markov process, with E(t) = 
and
R 1
0
itdi = 0. In our benchmark analysis, we simply assume that it is known
at beggining-of-period t. Assuming that the liquidity shock is anticipated is a
convenient way of capturing the perceived availability of liquidity. More generally,
we can think of expected changes in the distribution of it. In Section 6, we show
that anticipated changes in the variance of it can have the same e¤ect.
Finally, we assume that the entrepreneur faces a standard credit constraint
at beginning-of-period t.18 A fraction 0  it  1 of the capital stock at the
beginning-of-period has to be used as collateral for debt repayments:
rtDit  it(1  )Kit (8)
In principle, the two constraints (6) and (8) could be related (e.g., as in Jermann
and Quadrini, 2012). However, we specify them independently as we will estimate
it and it from the data.
The parameter it is composed of an aggregate component and a rm-specic
one:
it = t + 

i (9)
where t follows an AR(1) process with E(t) =  and
R 1
0
i di = 0. In this paper,
we make the distinction between a standard credit shock, it, and a liquidity shock,
it. The former can be viewed as a standard disturbance on the banking sector
since it a¤ects the long-term credit. The latter corresponds to an exogenous change
in the availability of external liquid funds, which may come from di¤erent sources.
3.2 Optimal Cash Holding and Employment
Entrepreneurs maximize (1) subject to (3), (5) and (8). The optimization of the
entrepreneur is described in details in Appendix A. We assume that shocks are
anticipated so the random variables Ait, it and it are known at beginning-of-
18The presence of credit constraints at the beginning-of-period is not crucial to the main
mechanisms we analyze, but it allows to study the impact of credit market shocks. Moreover,
it is a convenient assumption with heterogenous rms, as it puts a limit to the size of the most
productive rms.
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period t. As cash does not yield any interest, one can also verify that (5) is always
binding so that fMit = 0.
It is convenient to express production as a function of the capital-labor ratio
kit = Kit=lit. We have F (Kit; Aitlit) = Aitlitf(kit=Ait) where f(k) = F (k; 1). The
optimality conditions with respect to lit and Kit imply that the capital-labor ratio
is described by (see Appendix A):
kit = Ait~k( ~wit; it; it) (10)
where ~wit = wt=Ait. As shown in the Appendix, ~k() is increasing in ~wit, it and
it. Indeed, a lower wage makes production less intensive in capital as opposed to
labor. Besides, as capital is the collateral, lower it and it reduces the collateral
value of capital and thus have a negative e¤ect on the capital-labor ratio. The
e¤ect of a reduction in TFP, A, is more ambiguous as it reduces both the marginal
productivity of labor and capital. In the Cobb-Douglas case where F (K;Al) =
K(Al)1 , however, we can show that overall, a lower productivity increases the
capital-labor ratio when  > 0. In that case, an reduction in A a¤ects the marginal
productivity of labor relatively more than the return on capital, because it does
not a¤ect the remaining stock of capital.
The cash ratio, which is a key variable in our analysis because it reects the
cash-intensity of production, can be derived from the above results. Using (5),
(10), and rLt Lit = it(1  )Kit, we nd:
Mit
Kit
=
1
kit

wt   it(1  )kit=rLt

=
wt
kit
  it(1  )=rLt (11)
The demand for cash per unit of capital is equal to the demand of cash per unit
of labor, divided by the capital-labor ratio. The demand for cash per unit of labor
is itself simply equal to the liquidity need per unit of labor (wt), minus external
liquidity per unit of labor (it(1   )kit=rLt ). A decrease in it has two e¤ects: a
direct negative e¤ect as it diminishes the access to external nance and an indirect
negative collateral e¤ect as the capital-labor ratio decreases. These two e¤ects
both increase the cash ratio. A decrease in it also increases the cash ratio, but
only through the negative negative collateral e¤ect. In contrast, a decrease in Ait
increases the capital-labor ratio and as a result it decreases the cash ratio. Equation
(11) then implies that the cash ratio, which depends solely on Mit=Kit, comoves
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negatively with it and positively with Ait.
To analyze labor demand, we will focus on cases where entrepreneurs are credit-
constrained and have log utility. Appendix A shows that the credit constraint is
binding whenever the wage paid by rms, wt, is lower than the marginal return
of labor, denoted wit. Moreover, with log utility Appendix A shows that optimal
consumption is cit = (1  )
it.
In that case, it is useful to rewrite the constraint (3) using (5), (8), and Lit =
it(1  )Kit: This gives:

it +
it(1  )Kit
rt
+
it(1  )Kit
rLt
= Kit + wtlit (12)
Equation (12) gives the budget constraint aggregated over the two subperiods. To-
tal nancing of rms, on the left-hand side, pays for inputs, on the right-hand side.
Both the long-term and short-term nancing conditions, represented respectively
by it and it, a¤ect the capacity of rms to nance labor lit. Using (12), the
optimal behavior of entrepreneurs is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Individual policy functions) Suppose that u(cit) = ln(cit). If
rt > r
L
t > 1 and wt < w

it, where kit is given by (10), then the liquidity constraint
(5) and the credit constraints (6) and (8) are binding and the policy functions for
Kit, Mit, lit, Dit;and 
it+1 satisfy:
lit = Zit
it (13)
Kit = kitZit
it (14)
Mit = [wt   it(1  )kit=rLt ]Zit
it (15)
Dit = it(1  )kitZit
it=rt (16)

it+1 = [(1  it   it)(1  )kit + Aitf(kit)]Zit
it (17)
where
Zit =

[kit + wt]  (it=rLt + it=rt)(1  )kit
: (18)
Proof. See Appendix A.
We call Zit the nancial multiplier. It measures the impact of a change in
income on labor demand. Notice that a decline in the nancing conditions it or
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it implies a smaller Zit, everything else equal. A worsening of nancing conditions
has thus a negative e¤ect on inputs, including labor. However, it also decreases the
capital-labor ratio as the collateral value of capital declines, which has a positive
e¤ect on labor. Under standard assumptions, the direct negative e¤ect dominates,
as shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Under the Cobb-Douglas production function, ceteris paribus, rms
with lower nancing conditions it or it have lower employment lit and a higher
cash ratio mit. Moreover, a lower productivity Ait a¤ects negatively employment lit
but has a negative e¤ect on the cash ratio mit.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Corollary 1 illustrates the main mechanism in the model. An expected decrease
in it implies a smaller amount of available liquid funds at end-of-period t. As a
response, rms naturally increase the proportion of cash in their portfolio, as seen
in (11). At the same time, they reduce their labor demand and their production, as
outside funding decreases. The same occurs with a decline in it, but the increase
in cash ratio is milder. This increase takes place as rms reduce their capital stock
relative to labor and hence relative to their liquidity needs, because of the indirect
collateral e¤ect. On the opposite, with a decline in productivity Ait, rms increase
their capital-labor ratio, which has a negative e¤ect on their cash ratio, as their
liquidity needs decline in proportion to capital. At the same time, labor declines.
The next two sections verify numerically the ceteris paribus result from Corol-
lary 1 in a dynamic model where the income level 
it is endogenous and the wage
rate wt is determined in the labor market. Section 4 focuses on aggregate shocks
and the time-series dimension, while Section 5 focuses on the cross-rm dimension.
3.3 Closing the Model
The model is closed by introducing households. Since the emphasis is on rms,
households are modeled in a simple way and the full description is left for Appendix
B. Identical households provide an innitely elastic supply of funds Dt to rms at
interest rate R = 1=, where  is the beginning-of-period to beginning-of-period
householdsdiscount factor, which is the same as rms. This is justied by a utility
function linear in consumption, the absence of nancial frictions for households
and the fact that unlike rms, households do not benet from a subsidy on debt.
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Similarly, we assume that householdsutility is linear in cash so that their supply
of cash is innitely elastic at rate 1.
At end-of-period t households also supply liquid funds Lt at rate rLt = 1= ,
where  is the households discount factor between the end-of-period and the
beginning-of-period. They always have su¢ cient cash since they receive their wages
at end-of-period t while they consume at beginning-of-period t+ 1.
Finally, households have a labor supply ls(wt) that depends positively on the
wage rate. In our specication, we have ls(wt) = (wt= w) where  > 0 is the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply and w is a positive constant (see Appendix B).
The wage rate is then determined endogenously so that ls(wt) =
R 1
0
litdi where
lit is the labor demand by rm i in period t. According to Proposition 1, lit =
l(wt; Ait; it; it;
it), so the equilibrium wage is dened by
ls(wt) =
Z 1
0
l(wt; Ait; it; it;
it)di; (19)
4 Aggregate Shocks
In this section, we focus on the time-series dimension, as described in Figure 1,
of the relationship between the cash ratio and employment. For this purpose, we
assume that all entrepreneurs are identical and only face aggregate shocks, so Ait =
it = 

i = 0. We also assume that entrepreneurs are always constrained by setting
 < 1 so that rt < 1=. In this context, we calibrate the model to analyze the
dynamic impact and the historical behavior of productivity and nancial shocks, in
the spirit of Jermann and Quadrini (2012). We derive three relevant series: liquidity
shocks t, productivity shocks At, and standard credit shocks t. We show that our
model reveals the presence of negative shocks on liquidity and credit over the recent
period, the former contributing the most to the negative comovement between cash
and labor.
4.1 Equilibrium
In the absence of idiosyncratic shocks, the only potential source of heterogeneity
between rms is their wealth. Since labor demand is linear in wealth, we can
then write
R 1
0
l(wt; At; t; t;
it)di = l(wt; At; t; t;
t) where 
t =
R 1
0

itdi. We
consider a constrained equilibrium dened as follows:
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Denition 1 (Constrained equilibrium under aggregate shocks only) For a given
aggregate wealth 
t and a given realization of At, t and t, a constrained period-
t equilibrium is a level of employment lt, of capital Kt, of cash Mt, of debt Dt,
of nancial multiplier Zt and of future wealth 
t+1 satisfying Equations (13) to
(18), where rt = =, the wage wt clears the labor market so that ls(wt) =
l(wt; At; t; t;
t) with l
s(wt) = (wt= w)
 and kt is the corresponding capital-labor
ratio given by Equation (10). Finally, the equilibrium wage must satisfy wt < wt .
Since aggregate labor demand depends on At, t, t and 
t, the equilibrium
wage also depends on those variables: wt = w(At; t; t;
t). For an individual rm,
we saw that the credit constraint is binding whenever wt < wit. At the aggregate
level, we can show that there exists an increasing function 
(At; t; t) so that
wt < w

t is equivalent to 
t < 

 . When the wage is low, rms want to use all their
resources to produce. However, because rmsresources are limited by the credit
constraints, the aggregate labour demand is low when the aggregate wealth is low,
which maintains the equilibrium wage at a low level and rms are constrained in
equilibrium. In this section, we focus on cases where this condition is satised
and we discuss the case where rms are unconstrained in Section 6. The following
Proposition shows under which conditions the steady state is constrained:
Proposition 2 (Constrained steady state under aggregate shocks only) The steady
state is constrained if and only if  < 1.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Individual agents and the aggregate economy will uctuate around a constrained
steady state. Intuitively, on the one hand, a wage that is lower than the marginal
productivity of labor makes the credit constraint binding, as stated in Proposition
1. On the other hand, the credit constraint makes the equilibrium wage dependent
on aggregate wealth. When  < 1, the net interest rate rt 1 is below the propensity
to consume out of wealth 1=   1, so rms never accumulate su¢ cient wealth to
be able to provide an equilibrium wage equal to marginal productivity.
4.2 Calibration
Table 1 shows the calibration used for the parameters. The rst ve parameters
are calibrated on standard values. Following Jermann and Quadrini (2012), we set
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the rmsdiscount factor equal to  = 0:9825 and  = 0:9939, implying a subsidy
on net interest debt payments of 35% and a steady-state annualized real interest
rate of 4%. The Frisch parameter, , is set to unity. We set the share of capital in
production, , to 0:36. We assume that the cost of using liquidity, rLt , is lower than
the gross interest rate, such that rLt = 1:01. The other parameters are calibrated
to match two empirical targets, using aggregate data. Precisely, the model has to
replicate the mean of the cash ratio and the debt to output ratio over the sample,
i.e. 3:3% and 50%, respectively.19 It follows that the liquidity parameter  is set
to 0:04 and the credit parameter  equals 0:06. Finally, we normalize A to unity.
[ insert Table 1 here ]
4.3 Liquidity, Credit and TFP Series
The theoretical framework is used to construct the three series we are interested in,
namely, TFP (At), liquidity (t) and credit (t). Let x^t denote the log-deviation of
the variable xt from its deterministic trend, correponding to HP-ltered empirical
data (detailed below). For technology, we derive the Cobb-Douglas production
function in loglinear terms
A^t =

1
1  

Y^t   l^t  


1  

K^t: (20)
For the credit series, we use the loglinearized version of the credit constraint, given
by Equation (8),
^t = D^t   K^t: (21)
Finally, the liquidity series is constructed using the liquidity constraint, see Equa-
tions (5) and (6),
^t =

wl=Y
(1  )K=Y

1


w^t + l^t

 

M=Y
(1  )K=Y

1

M^t   K^t: (22)
19As in Section 2, the cash ratio is dened as the share of liquidity to total assets from the non-
nancial corporate business sector. The debt to output ratio is measured by the ratio between
credit market instruments (liabilities) from the non-nancial corporate business sector and the
gross value added in the business sector. Data sources are available in the online appendix.
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All the parameters are taken from the calibration and the models steady-state. We
use empirical data of output (Y^t), measured as the gross value added in the business
sector from NIPA. The wage bill (w^t+ ^`t) is measured as the hourly compensation
index  hours worked in the nonfarm business sector from BLS. Debt series (D^t) is
measured by credit market instruments (liabilities) from the non-nancial corporate
business sector from Flow of Funds. Capital (K^t) is measured using total capital
expenditures and consumption of xed capital of non-nancial corporate business
sector from Flow of Funds, as in Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Liquidity and
employment are those used in Section 2. All the nominal series are deated by
the price index for gross value added in the business sector from NIPA and HP-
detrended series.20
Figure 3 plots the series of TFP, credit and liquidity, constructed from Equations
(20)-(22).
[ insert Figure 3 here ]
Over the sample 1980q1 to 2011q4, the liquidity series features less persistence
than the credit series and those two are more volatile than productivity. Regard-
ing the recent period, the economy experienced a reduction in ^t, below its trends,
which can be viewed as a shortage in external liquidity supply. This negative liquid-
ity shock has been combined with a reduction in ^t, interpreted as a negative credit
shock. Our model predicts that the Great Recession was mostly driven by nan-
cial shocks, i.e. liquidity and credit shocks, rather than a technology shock. This
latter result is in line with Jermann and Quadrini (2012) who construct a generic
nancial shock. As shown in Figure 1, the negative comovement between cash
and employment was particularly pronounced during the nancial crisis. While
credit and the liquidity shocks move closely together in the Great Recession, they
are not correlated over the longer sample. In order to understand the role of the
three shocks on this comovement, we turn to an analysis of the impulse response
functions.
4.4 Impulse Response Functions
We examine the impact of a 1 percent decrease in aggregate liquidity, technology
and credit from their steady-state level. We estimate an AR(1) process on the
series ^t, ^t and A^t to obtain the autoregressive parameters, such that A = 0:76,
20Details on data sources are provided in the online appendix.
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 = 0:97 and  = 0:41. The impulse response functions (IRFs) are computed by
determining the equilibrium wage, wt, that clears the labor market and using in
turn the policy functions (13) to (17).21 Figure 4 displays the IRFs to the three
shocks. The solid, dotted and dashed lines correspond to a response to t, At and
t, respectively.
[ insert Figure 4 here ]
The upper panel in Figure 4 displays the responses to the cash ratio and em-
ployment to a 1 percent decrease in the three shocks. The two nancial shocks
generate a negative comovement between employment and the cash ratio. Consid-
ering a negative liquidity shock, i.e., a decline in t, rms have smaller external
liquid funds to pay for wage bills at end-of-period. The cash ratio mt rises through
two channels. Through the direct e¤ect rms need to compensate for the reduced
access to external liquidity by relying more on internal liquidity. Through the in-
direct collateral e¤ect the collateral value of capital is reduced relative to labor
which reduces the scale of assets. Altogether, these two channels drive the cash
ratio in the same upward direction. In the case of a negative credit shock, only
the collateral motive plays a role on the cash ratio which slightly increases. The
reason of this modest increase is that the credit shock does not directly a¤ect the
structure of the portfolio between internal and external liquidity. On the other
hand, a reduction in nancial opportunities (i.e., shortage in external liquidity and
credit) lowers labor demand at beginning-of-period through the nancial multiplier.
Therefore, employment lt decline. When it comes to a negative technology shock,
the comovement between employment and the cash ratio is di¤erent. As explained
above, a decline in productivity At rises the capital-labor ratio which increases
in turn the scale of assets as compared to liquidity needs and generates a slight
reduction in the cash ratio. Production is therefore less intensive in cash. The
other e¤ect, more standard, is to decrease employment through a tighter nancial
multiplier.
The lower panel in Figure 4 shows the remaining IRFs. The three recessionary
shocks generate a decline in wages and therefore a reduction in liquidity needs. The
response of debt is mostly driven by negative credit shocks although it evolves in
the same pattern as labor in all experiments, which is in line with Covas and den
Haan (2012) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) who stress that debt is procyclical.
21We check that we do have wt < wt every period.
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Capital also decreases in response to the nancial shocks while it increases on
impact in response to the TFP shock, due to the rise in the capital-labor ratio
mentioned above.
To shed further light on the dynamics of output, we compute their variance
decomposition on output, as displayed in Figure 5.
[ insert Figure 5 here ]
The three series of ^t, ^t and A^t constructed from Equations (20)-(22) are used
to compute the fraction of the forecast error variance of output attributable to
each type of shock. We nd that liquidity shocks have a signicant contribution to
business cycles. More precisely, we nd that on impact, the liquidity shock explains
most of the variance (71%) while over a longer horizon, i.e. one year, 64% of the
variance of output is explained by credit shocks. The contribution of TFP shocks
peaks at 40% after two quarters.22 Using the identied shocks, we also compute the
fraction of the correlation between the cash ratio and employment that is due to
each shocks. It appears that, consistently with the IRFs, liquidity shocks explain
79% of the correlation. Episodes of drops in employments that are accompanied
with a rise in cash ratio can then be mostly attributable to a liquidity shock.
5 Cross-rms Correlations
We now assess whether the calibrated model is able to explain the cross-rm ev-
idence of a negative correlation between cash and employment. To examine this
issue, we reintroduce heterogeneous rms that are hit by idiosyncratic productivity
shocks Ait and liquidity shocks 

it. Instead we assume for simplicity that the aggre-
gate economy does not uctuate by setting At = A, t = . As a benchmark, we
assume that credit constraints do not vary across rms and time and set it = .
We relax this assumption later by assuming that rms can have di¤erent levels of
credit constraints.
22These results are consistent with Jermann and Quadrini (2012) who argue that nancial
shocks contribute to a large extend to the business cycle. One might argue that the limited
contribution of TFP to output uctuations results from our measure of TFP series constructed
from Equation (20). As a robustness, we use the utilization-adjusted quarterly-TFP seriesfor
the U.S. business sector, produced by John Fernald and available on his website. We nd that
TFP shocks still explain 38% of the variance of output after two quarters.
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5.1 Equilibrium
As in the case with aggregate shocks only, we consider a constrained equilibrium
dened as follows:
Denition 2 (Constrained equilibrium under idiosyncratic shocks only) For a
given period-t distribution of wealth, productivity and liquidity f
it; Ait; itgi2[0;1],
a constrained period-t equilibrium is given by the rm-specic levels of employment
lit, of capital Kit, of cashMit, of debt Dit, of Zit and of future wealth 
it+1 satisfying
Equations (13) to (18), where rt = =, the wage wt clears the labor market such
that (19) is satised with ls(wt) = (wt= w) and kt is the corresponding capital-labor
ratio given by Equation (10). Finally, the equilibrium wage must satisfy wt < wit
for all i 2 [0; 1].
In our simulation exercise, we check ex post that we do have wt < wit for all i.
5.2 Calibration
Beside the parameter values described in the previous section, we aim at calibrating
a range for it = + it and Ait = A+ 
A
it. We assume that these shocks can take
10 equidistant possible realizations. The two shocks are assumed to follow an
independent rst-order Markov process with transition probability of 0:25
9
. More
precisely, each rm has a probability of 75% to stay in the same state for  (A)
and a probability of 25% to switch to one of the 9 other states, with an identical
probability for each of these states. We calibrate the range for it and Ait (namely,
we set the minimum and maximum values) to match some distribution moments
observed at the rm level. Table 1 provides the interquartile values to match,
computed from the Compustat database described in Section 2. The range of the
idiosyncratic liquidity and productivity shocks it and Ait are set to reproduce
the interquartile ratio for our two variables of interest, namely the cash ratio and
employment. This implies it 2 [0:01; 0:091] and Ait 2 [0:94; 1:07]. All the other
parameters are calibrated as described in Section 4.2. The numerical method to
obtain the steady-state wage and distribution of rms is described in Appendix D.
5.3 Results
The upper panel of Table 2 displays rm-level moments computed from the station-
ary distribution. Interestingly, our stylized model provides a negative cross-rm
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correlation between the cash ratio and employment, equals to  0:13 under our
benchmark calibration. This number is somewhat smaller than the number found
in the data ( 0:29).
[ insert Table 2 here ]
To understand this result, Figure 6 shows the impact of an idiosyncratic innovation
of it and Ait on the value of the labor normalized by wealth (`it=
it) and the cash
ratio (mit), both weighted by the distribution probability.
[ insert Figure 6 here ]
This gure shows that, as it decreases, the cash ratio is higher and labor is lower for
a given 
it. Di¤erently, rms facing a negative productivity shock adjust both labor
and the cash ratio downward. Consequently, even though the two shocks predict
an opposite correlation between employment and the cash ratio, our calibrated liq-
uidity shock is strong enough to generate a reasonable negative correlation. When
the amount of liquid funds is reduced, rms are able to nance less labor with the
same amount of cash. To accommodate for this shock, they both accumulate more
cash in order to pay for the wage bill and diminish their level of labor to limit the
wage bill.
However, while the normalized labor (lit=
it) is independent of 
it according
to Proposition 1, the level of labor lit is driven by the size of the rm 
it, which
depends on the history of shocks. As a consequence, the correlation between the
cash ratio and labor is driven not only by Ait and it as suggested by Figure 6, but
also by 
it. The lower panel of Table 2 complements the previous gure by showing
the weighted value of these variables by class of rms. While rms with a level
of wealth below median have on average a substantially lower level of employment
than rms with a level of wealth above median, their cash ratio is about the same on
average. On the one hand, idiosyncratic innovations on liquidity () and technology
(A) a¤ect the cash ratio and labor, as shown in Figure 6. On the other hand, they
also a¤ect rmswealth and therefore employment for a given level of cash. This
heterogeneity of wealth generates noise that further dampens the correlation.
We can also show that the credit constraint a¤ects the correlation between
the cash ratio and employment through a multiplier e¤ect. To do so, we consider
two di¤erent states for i such that i = fL; Hg, where L < H . In order to
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be consistent with the calibration strategy described above, we set the value of
i;L and i;H in order to match the interquartile ratio for debt to sales from our
Compustat database. This strategy implies that most nancially-constrained rms
are those with i = L where L = 0:02, while less constrained rms have i = H ,
where H = 0:10. Our model shows that L-type rms exhibit a less negative
correlation between the cash ratio and labor than H-type rms ( 0:11 and  0:15,
respectively). Therefore, the simulation results reveal that the correlation between
cash and labor is stronger for less nancially-constrained rms. Those rms have
a larger nancial multiplier since they have more resources through their level of
borrowing. Consequently, their labor is more sensitive to productivity and liquidity
shocks, while their cash ratio is barely a¤ected by the level of i. This implies that
the correlation between cash and labor is larger for a large i. This is consistent
with the data. Smaller rms in terms of sales or debt-to-sales ratio, that are more
likely to be credit constrained, have a less negative correlation between the cash
ratio and employment. For example, the 25 percent smaller rms in terms of
sales have a correlation of  0:24 compared to  0:33 for the top 25 percent. The
analogous correlations are  0:24 and  0:35 when we rank rms by their debt-to-
sales ratio.
6 Extensions
The benchmark model has abstracted from various elements that could be relevant
to the analysis. In this section we describe several extensions. First, we analyze
the case where rms are not credit-constrained. Second, we discuss the impact of
liquidity uncertainty with unanticipated liquidity shocks. Third, we discuss the
impact of unexpected productivity shocks that provide an alternative explanation
for the negative comovement between cash and employment.
6.1 Unconstrained Firms
We assumed so far that rt < 1=, so that rms are always credit-constrained.
This has two advantages: it enables us to examine the e¤ect of a standard credit
shock and it helps sustain an equilibrium with heterogeneous rms. It is however
important to examine how this assumption a¤ects the response of the economy
to liquidity and productivity shocks. We show that in the absence of credit con-
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straints, a liquidity shock a¤ects essentially the cash ratio while a productivity
shock a¤ects essentially labor. Cash and labor are thus more disconnected than in
the benchmark constrained case.
In order to simulate the unconstrained case, we set rt equal to 1= and assume
that  is su¢ ciently high so that rms never hit their credit limit. We otherwise
use the same calibration as in the benchmark model. Since r = 1=, the level of
wealth is undetermined in the steady state. For comparison purposes, we set the
initial level of 
 to the same level as in the benchmark steady state. Figure 7 shows
the simulation results.
[ insert Figure 7 here ]
Following a negative liquidity shock, the economy experiences a decrease in em-
ployment and an increase in the cash ratio as in the benchmark. Indeed, on the
one hand, rms need more cash to produce. On the other hand, as cash is costly,
labor becomes less productive, so the demand for labor and the equilibrium wage
decrease. Notice, however, that the e¤ect on employment and wage is much milder
when rms are unconstrained as compared to the benchmark, where rms are
constrained. Indeed, as long as the cost of liquidity rLt is not too high, the liquid-
ity shock barely a¤ects labor productivity. Therefore, in the absence of constraint,
rms do not change their labor demand dramatically. In the presence of credit con-
straints, the demand for labor and hence the equilibrium wage depend on rms
resources. Since fewer external resources are available, rms have to cut on labor
hiring, generating a stronger reaction of labor demand.
Consider now the e¤ect of a negative productivity shock. While employment
decreases as in the benchmark, the cash ratio remains constant. Indeed, the pro-
ductivity shock has a direct negative e¤ect on the availability of external liquidity,
but it has also a negative indirect, general equilibrium e¤ect on the wage and
hence on liquidity needs. In the absence of credit constraints, the equilibrium wage
is more sensitive to productivity as compared to the case with credit constraints,
where labor demand and the wage depend on wealth. Since, in the latter case, the
response of aggregate wealth is sluggish, then so are the responses of labor and the
wage. Finally, since the wage, and hence liquidity needs, decrease more when rms
are unconstrained, the increase in the cash ratio is mitigated as compared to the
benchmark. Actually, the decrease in liquidity needs perfectly compensates for the
decrease in external liquidity, leaving the cash ratio unchanged.
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6.2 Liquidity Uncertainty
In our analysis, rms know perfectly the amount of external liquidity they can get
at the end-of-period, i.e., it is known at beginning-of-period t. If instead we assume
that only the distribution of it is known, we can analyze the impact of an increase
in uncertainty in it. Not surprisingly, an increase in liquidity uncertainty increases
the demand for cash and decreases employment on average.23 In particular, if we
assume that labor is set at the beginning of period, then an increase in uncertainty
has the same e¤ect as an anticipated negative liquidity shock.
To understand this result, consider the simple case where there are two possible
states for it: Lt =  $t and Ht = +$t, with $t > 0. The magnitude of $t,
and thus the variance of it, is known at the beginning of period but it is revealed
only at the end of period. When $t increases, the rm increases its cash holdings.
When labor is predetermined at the end-of-period, rms actually hold just enough
cash to be able to nance the wage bill in the worst case where it = Lt . The reason
is that insu¢ cient cash would leave the rm with no revenues (
it+1 = 0).24 This
prospect deters rms from putting themselves in such a situation, as the utility is
logarithmic and log(0) =  1. In the event where it = Ht , rms do not draw
down on the whole line of credit as it is costly (rLt > 1), and they set Lit = 
L
t Yit.
Thus, cash holdings move proportionately to$t and rms behave exactly as if their
anticipated liquidity shock was Lt .
6.3 Unanticipated Productivity Shocks
In this paper we focus on active liquidity management by rms, i.e., the optimal
choice of cash holdingsMit. However, a proportion of cash holding may come from
unexpected unused cash fMit, which has been equal to zero so far in our analysis.
This may give an alternative explanation to the negative comovement between cash
and employment. Assume that productivity shocks are not known at beginning-of-
period t and that rms can adjust their employment within the end-of-period (i.e.,
employment is not predetermined as in 6.2). In that case, unused cash fMit is no
23This hoarding behavior is reminiscent of the literature on precautionary savings initiated by
Bewley (1986) and Aiyagari (1994).
24This implicitly assumes that the punishment the rms face for not honoring the contract
entails both that households do not work and that money holdings are seized, leaving the rms.
This also supposes that money is a perfectly pledgable asset and that households are credible
enough to implement that punishment.
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longer necessarily equal to zero. For example, an unexpected decline in At implies
a lower need for liquidity and thus higher fMit. Thus, we would have a negative
comovement between unexpected cash holding fMit and labor demand. However,
if the productivity shock is persistent (e.g., as in (2)) the path of productivity in
subsequent periods is anticipated as in our benchmark analysis. Overall, except for
the e¤ect on impact, the dynamic e¤ect of an unanticipated productivity shock is
similar to an anticipated productivity shock.
The model therefore predicts a temporary increase in relative cash holdings.
After an initial negative shock, the cash ratio is reduced to adjust for lower ex-
pected productivity. In contrast, it is sometimes argued, especially in the wake
of the nancial crisis, that rms keep holding cash because of low investment op-
portunities. For this argument to hold in our model, we should assume repeated
unanticipated negative productivity shocks. Alternatively, we would need to add
some adjustment costs for reducing money holdings or assume that rmsliquidity
management is totally passive, i.e., rms would not choose their optimal level of
Mit.
7 Conclusion
This paper has documented a negative comovement between the corporate cash
ratio and employment. Even though such a relationship may appear surprising at
rst sight, we show that it can be explained by liquidity shocks. These shocks make
production less attractive or more di¢ cult to nance, while they also generate a
need for liquidity necessary to pay wage bills, which can be satised by holding
more cash. Moreover, we argue that our analysis is useful in understanding the
motives for rms cash holdings and in shedding light on the dominant shocks
during the nancial crisis.
Besides explaining an interesting stylized fact, the simple model developed in
this paper could be extended to analyze the role of corporate liquidity in a macro-
economic environment. Several extensions could be of interest. First, instead of
focusing on the business cycle frequency, the model could be used to examine longer
term developments. The model would actually be consistent with the documented
gradual increase in cash holdings if we assume changes in the production process
that imply more end-of-period payments (e.g., with more extensive use of just-
in-time technologies as reported in Gao, 2013, or with an increase in production
26
outsourcing). A second extension, that would lead to a richer analysis, is to intro-
duce nancial intermediaries. Third, for a better analysis of the nancial crisis, it
would be of interest to introduce demand shocks. Finally, the role of policy inter-
vention would be a natural extension. The last two extensions would be related
to the existing DSGE literature incorporating working capital to study monetary
policy.
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Appendix
A The Entrepreneurs Problem
Entrepreneurs maximize (1) subject to (3), (4), (5), (6) and (8) and ~Mt  0. They
also take into account the production function Yit = F (Kit; Aitlit). The production
function has constant returns to scale so we can write Yit = Aitlitf(kit=Ait), with
f(k) = F (k; 1) and with k the capital-labor ratio K=l. The Lagrangian problem is
Lit = Et
1X
s=t
s t fu(cis)
+is
h
~Mis 1 + Yis 1 + (1  )Kis 1   rs 1Dis 1   rLts 1Lis 1 +Dis   cis  Kis  Mis
i
+is
h
Mis + Lis   wtlis   ~Mis
i
+is [is(1  )Kis   rsDis]
+is

is(1  )Kis   rLs Lis

+is ~Misg
The entrepreneurs program yields the following rst-order conditions with re-
spect to lit, cit, Dit, Mit, ~Mit and Lit:
wtit = AitFlitEtit+1 (23)
u0(cit) = it (24)
it = rtEtit+1 + rtit (25)
it = it (26)
it = Etit+1 + it (27)
it = r
L
t Etit+1 + r
L
t it (28)
Studying these FOCs indicates which constraints are binding. Since  = u0(c) >
0, then  > 0 according to (26), which implies that both budget constraints are
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binding. Moreover, using (23), (25) and (26), we obtain:
Etit+1

AitFlit
wit
  rt

= rtit
This implies that whenever wr < AFl, the long-term credit constraint is binding
( > 0). Besides, using (25), (26) and (28), we nd:
Etit+1(rt   rLt ) = rLt it   rtit
Therefore, if the long-term credit constraint is binding ( > 0) and rt > rLt , then
the short-term credit constraint is binding too ( > 0). Finally, using (27) and
(28), we nd:
Etit+1(r
L
t   1) = it   rLt it
Therefore, if the short-term credit constraint is binding ( > 0) and rLt > 1, then
the entrepreneurs hold no excess money ( > 0).
Assume now that rt > rLt > 1 and make the guess that  > 0 (we will determine
later under which conditions the long-term credit constraint is indeed binding).
Then all the constraints are binding and we can write ~M = 0, D = (1   )K=rt
and M = wl   (1  )K=rLt . We can then rewrite the objective as
Lit = Et
P1
s=t 
s t fu(cis)
+is

Yis 1 + (1  )Kis 1(1  is 1   is 1)
 cit  Kis[1  (1  )(is=ris + is=rLis)]  wislis
 (29)
The optimality conditions with respect to cit, lit and Kit are:
it = u
0(cit) (30)
wtit = AitFlitEtit+1 (31)
[1  (1  )(it=rLt + it=rt)]it = Etit+1[FKit + (1  )(1  it   it)] (32)
Combining (31) with (32), we obtain:
wt
Ait
=
[1  (1  )(it=rLt + it=rt)]Flit
FKit + (1  )(1  it   it)
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F has constant returns to scale so we can write: F (K;Al) = Alf(K=Al). There-
fore, FK(K;Al) = f 0(K=Al) and Fl(K;Al) = f(K=Al)   Kf 0(K=Al)=Al. As a
consequence, wt=Ait = ~w(~kit; it; it), with ~kit = Kit=Aitlit and
~w(~k; ; ) =
[1  (1  )(=rLt + =rt)][f(~k)  ~kf 0(~k)]
f 0(~k) + (1  )(1    ) (33)
Since F is concave in both arguments, we have f 00 < 0, which implies that ~w
is strictly increasing in ~k. If there exists a solution ~k( ~wt; it; it) to that equation,
then this solution is unique. Finally, kit is then given by kit = Ait~k( ~wt; it; it).
Note that the long-term credit constraint is binding whenever ~wr < Fl. Besides,
if it is the case, then all the other constraints are binding, as rLt > 1 and rt > r
L
t .
We thus have simply to determine when ~wr < Fl. Combing this inequality with
(33), we nd that this is equivalent to:
f 0(~k) + (1  )(1    ) > rt[1  (1  )(=rLt + =rt)] (34)
, ~k < (f 0 1

rt[1  (1  )(=rLt + =rt)]  (1  )(1    )

Finally, according to (33), ~k is increasing in ~w, so this inequality is satised for ~w
lower than some ~w(; ) and thus for w lower than some w(A; ; ).
In order to study how k is a¤ected by , we di¤erentiate Equation (33) with
respect to it and nd after rearranging
@~k
@
=
 (1  )[f(~k)  ~kf 0(~k)]
h
f 0(~k) rt
rt
+ (1  )

1 
rt
+ 
rLt
i
f 00(~k)[1  (1  )(it=rLt + it=rt)][f(~k) + (1  )(1    )~k]
As f 00 < 0, both the numerator and denominator are negative so @~k=@it > 0.
Similarly, we nd @~k=@it > 0. Then k is also increasing in  and .
Di¤erentiating Equation (33) with respect to ~w, we nd after rearranging
@~k
@ ~w
=
[f 0(~k) + (1  )(1    )]2
 f 00(~k)[1  (1  )(=rLt + =rt)][f(~k) + (1  )(1    )~k]
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Note that k = A~k and w = A ~w so
@k
@w
= A
@~k
@ ~w
@ ~w
@w
=
@~k
@ ~w
> 0
@k
@A
= ~k + A @
~k
@ ~w
@ ~w
@A
= ~k + @
~k
@ ~w
~w
= ~k   [f 0(~k)+(1 )(1  )][f(~k) ~kf 0(~k)] f 00(~k)[f(~k)+(1 )(1  )~k]
In the Cobb-Douglas case, we have
@k
@A
=
 (1  )(1  )(1    )f(~k)
 f 00(~k)[f(~k) + (1  )(1    )~k] < 0
Proof of Proposition 1 Assume that the credit constraint is binding and that
rt > r
L
t > 1. Then the program of the rm is described by (29) and by the FOCs
(30)-(32) and by (33). We make the educated guess that there exists  such that
cit = (1  )
it. Combining our guess with (3), (5), (6), (8) and (11), we obtain

it = Kit+wtlit (1 )(it=rLt +it=rt)Kit = Aitlit[~kit+ ~wit (1 )(it=rLt +it=rt)~kit]
Replacing ~wit using (33) and rearranging, we obtain

it = Aitlit
[1  (1  )(it=rLt + it=rt)][f(~kit) + (1  )(1  it   it)~kit]
f 0(~kit) + (1  )(1  it   it)
As 
it+1 = Aitlit[f(~kit) + (1  )(1  it   it)~kit], we have

it =
[1  (1  )(it=rLt + it=rt)]
it+1
f 0(~kit) + (1  )(1  it   it)
(35)
Using (30) and (32) under log-utility u(c) = log(c), we obtain the following
Euler equation
1
cit
[1  (1  )(it=rLt + it=rt)] = Et

1
cit+1

[f 0(~kit) + (1  )(1  it   it)]
Given that shocks are known at the beginning-of-period, cit+1 = 
it+1 is known
at the beginning-of-period, so the Euler equation can be written without the ex-
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pectations operator
1
cit
[1  (1  )(it=rLt + it=rt)] = 
1
cit+1
[f 0(~kit) + (1  )(1  it   it)]
Using our guess cit = 
it and cit+1 = 
it+1 to replace cit and cit+1, we obtain

it =
[1  (1  )(it=rLt + it=rt)]
it+1
f 0(~kit) + (1  )(1  it   it)
(36)
Combining (35) and (36) yields  = .
Combining cit = (1   )
it with the binding constraints (3), (5) and (8), we
can easily derive equations (13)-(17) in Proposition 1.
Proof of Corollary 1 According to Equation (11), a decline in it increases
the cash ratio through a lower level of external liquid funds and through a lower
capital-labor ratio. A decline in it increases the cash ratio through a lower capital-
labor ratio. A decline in Ait decreases the cash ratio through a higher capital-labor
ratio.
According to Equation (13), the e¤ect on labor depends directly on the e¤ect
on the nancial multiplier Zit. We can rewrite Zit as follows:
Zit =

wit + Ait~kit[1  (1  )(it=rLt + it=rt)]
So the e¤ect on Zit depends on the e¤ect on Xit = ~kit[1  (1  )(it=rLt + it=rt)].
In the Cobb-Douglas case, we have
@X
@
= (1  )f(~k) (1  )(1    )=r   (1  )

1  (1  )  1 
r
+ 
rL

jf 00(~k)j[f(~k) + (1  )(1    )~k] < 0
Similarly, we have @X=@ < 0. Therefore, a decline in  or  decreases the nancial
multiplier Z and hence has a negative impact on labor.
Note nally that, in the Cobb-Douglas case, kit is decreasing in Ait as shown
earlier. As a result, Z and l are increasing in A.
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B The Household Problem
Identical households have a linear utility Ut with the discount factor , and no
nancial frictions:
EtUt = Et
1X
s=0
s
"
chbt+s +  
 1chet+s + (1  )Mht+s    w
l
1+1=
t+s
1 + 1=
#
(37)
where chb is householdsconsumption in the beginning-of-period, che is households
consumption in the end-of-period and Mh are the households beginning-of-period
money holdings.   is the preference for end-of-period consumption relative of
beginning of period consumption. As the household has a preference for the
beginning-of-period, then   1 < 1 so 1= < 1=. the household has a prefer-
ence for t end-of-period over time t+1 beginning-of-period,   1 > , so 1= > 1.
Households maximize this utility subject to their beginning-of-period and end-
of-period budget constraints
Rt 1Dht 1 +M
h
t + c
h
t = D
h
t + r
M
t 1 ~M
h
t 1 + r
L
t 1Lt 1 + Tt
wtlt +M
h
t = Lt + ~M
h
t
where Dh is household debt and ~Mh are the households end-of-period money
holdings. rM is the return of 1 unit of cash. At end-of-period, households lend part
of their wage wtlt to the rms. This lending Lt yields rL. rL is the equilibrium
return on short-term lending. Tt = Rt 1(   1) are taxes that nance the debt
subsidy for rms.
Householdsoptimization then implies that, in equilibrium, lt = (wt= w), Rt =
1=, rMt = 1 and r
L
t = 1= , with 1 < r
L < R. Note that, in equilibrium, households
are indi¤erent between consuming in the beginning and the end of period. As
output is available only at the beginning-of-period, consumption takes place only
in the beginning-of-period.
C Equilibriumwith aggregate shocks only (Proof
of Proposition 2)
Before proving Proposition 2, we establish the following Lemma:
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Lemma 1 There exists an increasing function 
(At; t; t) so that the credit con-
straint is binding whenever 
t < 
. In that case the dynamics of Kt, Mt, Dt, lt
and 
t+1 follow:
lt = Z(wt; At; t; t)
t (38)
Kt = k(wt; At; t; t)Z(wt; At; t; t)
t (39)
Mt = (wt   t(1  )k(wt)= )Z(wt; At; t; t)
t (40)
Dt = t(1  )k(wt; At; t; t)=rt]Z(wt; At; t; t)
t=rt (41)

t+1 = [(1 )(1 t t)k(wt; At; t; t)+Atf [k(wt; At; t; t)=At]Z(wt; At; t; t)
t
(42)
where
Z(wt; At; t; t) =

[k(wt) + wt]  (1  )k(wt; At; t; t)(t= + t=rt)
is the nancial multiplier and
wt = w(At; t; t;
t)
is the equilibrium wage so that w(At; t; t;
t) is the solution to l
s(wt) = Z(wt; At; t; t)rt
t.
Proof. Note that, as shown earlier, the credit constraint is binding whenever
w < w(A; ; ). Since we also have that the constrained equilibrium wage w is in-
creasing in 
t, then there exists an increasing function 
 so that wt < w(At; t; t)
is equivalent to 
t < 
(At; t; t). The rest of the Lemma derives from Proposition
1.
Using this Lemma, we can study the steady state. From Equation (42), we have
that the steady-state wage must satisfy:
~w + ~k   (1  )(= + =r)~k = [f(~k) + (1  )(1    )~k]
Replacing ~w using (33) and rearranging:
1  (1  )(= + =r) = [f 0(~k) + (1  )(1    )]
Then inequality (34) is satised if and only if 1= > r, which is the case if and only
if  < 1. Therefore, the credit constraint is binding in the steady state ( > 0)
34
whenever  < 1. This proves Proposition 2.
D Numerical method
The algorithm to compute the steady-state distribution of rms is as follows:
1. We rst choose a grid of wealth 
it. Our grid is a 1000-value grid over [5; 65].
We use the Chebychev nodes to make the grid more concentrated on low
values of 
.
2. We allocate an initial uniform and independent distribution to the values of

i0, i0 and Ai0, and make an initial guess on the equilibrium wage w0.
3. Given the initial distribution on 
it, it and Ait and the initial equilibrium
wage w0, we use Proposition 1 and the Markov Chain to compute the new
distribution of 
it+1, it+1 and Ait+1. Using Proposition 1, we compute the
corresponding distribution of labor demand lit+1. We aggregate this labor
demand lt+1 =
P
i lit+1di, and if lt+1 > l
s(wt) (if lt+1 < ls(wt)), then we
update the equilibrium wage wt+1 upward (downward).
4. We repeat step 3 until the equilibrium wage is reached, i.e. when aggregate
labor demand is fully satised.
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Table 1. Calibration Strategy
Calibrated Parameters Value
 Discount factor 0:9825
 Debt subsidy 0:35
r Gross interest rate on bonds 1:012
rL Liquidity cost 1:01
 Frisch parameter 1
 Elasticity of output wrt capital 0:36
 Collateral share for debt 0:0605
 s.s collateral share for liquidity 0:0409
i Firm-specic collateral share for liquidity [0:01; 0:091]
A Steady-state productivity shock 1:00
Ai Firm-specic productivity shock [0:64; 1:07]
40
Table 2. Simulated Moments
Benchmark Calibration Data Model
m75%
m25%
Interquartile ratio of m 7:60 7:68
`75%
`25%
Interquartile ratio of ` 1:46 1:42
corr(m; `) Correlation(cash ratio; labor)  0:29  0:13
Average value of labor and cash ratio by class of rms ` m

i bottom 50% 0:65 0:03
top 50% 1:04 0:03
i bottom 50% 0:74 0:05
top 50% 0:77 0:01
Ai bottom 50% 0:71 0:02
top 50% 0:80 0:03
Notes: In the upper panel, the empirical correlation between m and ` is computed after removing
the rm-specic linear trend from data. In the lower panel, all the values of labor and the cash ratio
are weighted by the distribution probability.
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Figure 1: Corporate Liquidity and Employment.
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Figure 2: Cross-section correlation between employment and the cash
ratio by year.
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Note: For both variables, we remove the rm-specic linear trend. Markers with circle
corresponds to correlation coe¢ cients signicant at 1%.
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Figure 3: TFP, credit and external liquidity series.
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Note: TFP, credit and external liquidity series are constructed from Equations (20)-(22).
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Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions to liquidity, TFP and credit shocks.
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Note: The solid lines correpond to the IRFs to an external liquidity shock (). The dotted
lines corresponds to the IRFs to a TFP shock (A). The dashed lines correspond to the IRFs
to a credit shock ().
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Figure 5: Variance error decomposition on output.
1 2 3 4 5
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Horizon, quarter
T FP
Liquidity
Credit
Note: The black bar measures the contribution of TFP shocks (A) on forecast variance of
output. The dark grey (light grey, resp.) measures the contribution of liquidity,  (credit,
resp., ) shocks.
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Figure 6: Value of the labor to wealth ratio (li=!i) and the cash ratio (mi).
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Note: All values of li=
i and mi are weighted by the distribution probability.
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Figure 7: Model with credit-unconstrained rms.
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Note: The solid lines correspond to the benchmark model. The dashed lines correspond to
the model with unconstrained rms. All IRFs are expressed in percentage deviation from
the steady-state.
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